While a VAT should in principle be neutral with respect to international trade, it may in practice function as a tax on exporters' input purchases if rms receive incomplete VAT refunds. Using data for over 100 countries that span the majority of historical VAT adoption episodes, this paper nds that consistent with this hypothesis the VAT reduces the exports of an industry with a 10% point higher intermediate goods share of output by over 8% relative to an industry with a lower share. This eect is driven by developing countries and is absent for high-income countries.
Introduction
The worldwide spread of the value-added tax (VAT) is often described as the most signicant global tax development of the past half-century (e.g. Keen and Lockwood, 2007) . One of the selling points of the VAT during this period has been that it is in principle neutral with respect to international trade and so would allow countries to raise government revenue without adversely aecting their international competitiveness. This neutrality depends on two features of a properly functioning VAT: export sales are not subject to domestic taxation and rms receive credits for VAT paid on their input purchases. While rms that only sell in their domestic market will generally use these credits to oset a portion of their VAT liability on their sales, exporters will routinely have credits exceeding their sales liability and hence will require refunds from the government. Although these refunds are popularly perceived as subsidies for exporters, they in fact merely ensure that the VAT does not devolve into a tax on exporting rms' input purchases (e.g. Feldstein and Krugman, 1990) .
In actual practice, the refund system has been the achilles' heel (Ebril et al., 2001 ) of the VAT in many countries. Firms are often unable to obtain the refunds that they are owed or are unable to do so in a reasonable and timely manner. This may be due to the fact that many governments lack the necessary administrative capacity to properly implement the VAT, especially given the legitimate concerns about potentially fradulent credit claims. It may also reect government ocials' reluctance to part with revenue that has ostensibly already been collected and come under their domain. These problems with the functioning of the VAT in practice give us strong reason to suspect that the VAT might indeed tax exporters' input purchases.
In this paper, I empirically evaluate whether this is in fact the case by drawing on simple consequence of an imperfect VAT: if the VAT functions as a tax on exporters' input purchases, it should disproportionately aect exports in industries that tend to rely more intensively on intermediate goods. We can therefore examine whether the VAT taxes exports through this channel by studying the dierential eect of VAT adoption on exports across industries. I examine this question using product-level international trade data for over 100 countries spanning a period from 1962-2015, which includes the majority of historical VAT adoption episodes. Guided by a multi-sector theoretical model of international trade, I employ an empirical specication that relates exports at the industry level to an interaction of VAT adoption in a country and the industry's intermediate goods share of output. This specication allows us to control for a wide range of unobservable factors through the inclusion of country-year, industry-year and country-industry xed effects. Since the intensity of intermediate goods use in a country is likely to be endogenous to the VAT, I calculate measures for each industry from US data, thus treating these intensities as technological characteristics of the industries in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) .
Consistent with my hypothesis, I nd that VAT adoption has a substantial negative eect on the exports of industries that rely more heavily on intermediate goods. Specically, an industry with a 10% point higher intermediate goods share of output sees a decline in exports of over 8% relative to an industry with a lower share. To put this magnitude in context, existing estimates of the relevant trade elasticities from Hummels (2001) and Hertel et al. (2007) imply that a 8% decrease in the exports of an industry would result from approximately 1-2% higher prices. These results are robust to the inclusion of country-industry time trends and I also employ a placebo test that nds no apparent evidence of an eect of the VAT prior to its actual adoption.
If these results are in fact driven by imperfections in the VAT refund system, we should expect to see considerable heterogeneity across countries, since VAT refund performance is likely to be substantially worse in developing countries relative to developed countries (e.g. Harrison and Krelove, 2005) .
In line with these considerations, I nd that the negative eect of the VAT is driven by low-and middle-income countries and that there is no signicant eect for high-income countries. Providing further evidence of the role of VAT refund administration in generating the results in this paper, I also nd that for a subset of countries with available information, the negative eect of the VAT is signicantly more pronounced in countries where a VAT refund request is more likely to trigger an audit. Taken together, these results suggest that the VAT does function in part as a tax on exports in countries that have a weak tax administration system.
Since the VAT was often introduced as a replacement for existing policies most commonly turnover taxes, sales taxes, and taris the eect of VAT adoption identied here would be the joint eect of removing these existing taxes and introducing the VAT. Since these replaced policies could themselves tax intermediate goods in some cases more obviously than the VAT should it is perhaps surprising that the VAT has a large negative eect of the type identied here. This could reect the fact that countries in practice rely on the VAT to a much greater extent than they did on the replaced policies, and so the VAT might simply be more signicant in an absolute sense. Broadly consistent with this explanation, I do not nd any evidence of a dierence in the eect of the VAT depending on the types of policies it replaces. This paper makes a contribution to the existing work in two distinct literatures. First, it is related to existing studies evaluating the eects of the VAT on international trade. Desai and Hines (2005) nd that the VAT substantially reduces the volume of trade, with a particularly pronounced eect for developing countries. Keen and Syed (2006) and Uer (2014) , however, nd no signicant eects of the VAT on trade. As highlighted by Keen and Lockwood (2007) , estimating the aggregate eects of the VAT is challenging because it is very dicult to disentangle the consequences of the VAT from factors that aect its adoption. By focusing on the dierential eect of the VAT across industries within a country, the approach taken in the present paper helps deal with these important endogeneity challenges.
Another related paper that specically emphasizes the importance of VAT refunds is Chandra and Long (2013) , who use Chinese data to nd that increased VAT rebates lead to an increase in exports. They evaluate the eects of an increase in VAT refunds, which is something quite distinct from the present paper, which studies the eect of adopting the VAT as a whole while emphasizing a mechanism that operates through an imperfect refund system. This paper is also connected to a large and growing literature in international trade that examines the determinants of export composition. In addition to classical determinants of comparative advantage such as factor endowments (Romalis, 2004) , this literature studies how country characteristics such as domestic institutions (e.g. Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007; Chor, 2008; Manova, 2008) , natural resources (Debaere, 2014) and demographic composition (Cai and Stoyanov, 2016) can also shape the composition of a country's exports.
1 The present paper uses a related style of analysis to show that domestic taxes can also signicantly aect export composition. Unlike the determinants of export composition considered in this existing literature, the VAT would not properly be a determinant of comparative advantage. This is because comparative advantage is rigorously dened in terms of Autarky prices (e.g. Deardor, 1980) , whereas an imperfect VAT is eectively a tax on exports. The nding here therefore complements the existing work in this area by identifying a factor that can distort export composition away from patterns of comparative advantage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a theoretical model that serves as a conceptual framework and helps interpret the empirical results. Section 3 discusses the empirical specication. Section 4 discusses the data sources and provides descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical analysis and Section 6 concludes.
1 See Nunn and Treer (2014) for a review of a portion of this literature.
Theoretical Framework
This section develops a theoretical framework that helps motivate and interpret the subsequent empirical analysis. In order to capture some of the key eects of the VAT on exports in a parsimonious manner, I use a multi-sector version of an Armington (1969) model. The Armington assumption implies that every country produces a dierentiated variety of each good. I assume that rms produce using a combination of labor and intermediate inputs,
and that the VAT system does not allow for a full rebate of the VAT paid on inputs.
Preferences
Consider a setting with many countries and goods. I assume a two-tiered utility function with an upper-tier Cobb-Douglas utility over goods and a lower-tier CES utility over the varieties of the good from each country. The upper-tier utility in country i is given by:
where α Z is the income share going to good z, u i (z) is the sub-utility from consumption of z in country i and G i is the quantity of a public good. The sub-utility is given by:
where q ij (z) is the quantity consumed in country i of the variety of z from country j. With this setup, households spend a xed fraction of their income α (z) on each good but can vary the fraction of their income that is devoted to the specic variety of the good produced in each country.
Labor is the only basic factor of production and labor income is the only source of household income. With this, the household demand for a variety of a good is given by:
where τ is the VAT rate, p j (z) is the price of country j's variety of z and P (z) is the ideal price index for good z. I assume that government revenue is used to provide the public good, G i . 
Production
Firms produce under constant returns to scale using labor and intermediate inputs. The production function specically takes the form:
where β (z) is the intermediate input share of output; A j (z) is the productivity of sector j in country z; L j (z) is the labor used in j for the production of z; and M j (z) is the quantity of a composite intermediate input. I assume that this composite is a CES aggregator with exactly the same two-tiered structure as the utility function as given by (1) and (2) and has a pre-tax price index equal to Q. 
A point to note in relation to the empirical analysis is that this setup Under these assumptions, the price that the rm is able to set for its nal good is determined by the Cobb-Douglas unit cost function:
This expression relates the price of the good to the wage and the intermediate input costs.
Exports
We can now use this setup to derive an expression for exports. Each country will export its variety of a good to the rest of the world to be used for both nal consumption and as an intermediate input. Given the upper-tier CobbDouglas assumption, (1), and the lower tier CES assumption, (2), households will spend a fraction
1−σ α (z) of their income on country j's variety of product z. Since labor is the only factor of production, the total income of households outside of country j is i =j w i L i . 5 Hence, foreign households' expenditure on country j's variety of z is
On the production side, rms in industry k in each country will spend a fraction β (k) on intermediate input purchases. Hence, the total intermediate input purchases of rms in industry k in a country i is
Summing across industries and countries, the total expenditure on all intermediate goods in all foreign countries is i =j
Since we are assuming the same two-tiered structure for the intermediate input composite as we are for the utility function, a fraction
1−σ α (z) of the total expenditure on intermediate goods will be on country j's variety of product z. Hence, the amount that foreign rms spend on country j's variety of z is
With all this in mind, the total exports (in value terms) of good z from country j can be written as:
where Y −j , the sum of total wages and total intermediate input expenses
in all foreign countries, is the value of total output in the world, excluding country j.
Next, we take the log of this expression to obtain:
Plugging in (3), we get:
For simplicity, I assume that the income of the rest of the world is a constant from the standpoint of the country under analysis, essentially assuming that this country is small. With this, by grouping all the terms that are constants from the standpoint of the exporting country into a single term, δ (z), and re-arranging, we can re-write log exports as:
This equation relates the exports of good z to an interaction of the country's tax system and the sector's intermediate input intensity.
This equation which will guide the empirical specication in Section 3 has two main terms. The rst captures the fact that in industries with a higher intermediate input intensity, β (z), the VAT will have a greater eect on exports. This is because as long as r < 1, the VAT directly aects the cost of using intermediate inputs. This naturally has a greater eect on an industry that relies more heavily on intermediate inputs. The second term captures the fact that a change in wages due to the VAT will have a dierential eect across industries depending on their labor intensity, 1 − β (z). The change in wages is a general equilibrium, economy-wide change but this expression shows that it could potentially have dierent eects across industries. This is a less direct channel than the primary channel of interest and will turn out to be insignicant empirically.
It will be to useful to use an approximation that allows this equation to be expressed in a form that is more convenient to interpret and work with.
Specically, we can use the fact that for a relatively small value for τ (1 − r), 
We will make extensive use of equation (4) later on.
Empirical Specication
The theoretical model from Section 2 explains why the VAT is likely to have heterogeneous eects on exports across industries that vary in terms of their intermediate input intensity. The empirical specication will be guided by equation (4), which relates the log of exports to an interaction between the VAT and the intermediate input intensity. The primary empirical specication will take the following form:
where x cit is the log of exports from country c in industry i in year t; v ct is a measure of the VAT in country c in year t; i it is a measure of the intermediate input intensity of industry i in year t; γ ct , δ it , and φ ci are country-year, industry-year and country-industry xed eects. The key coecient of interest is α 2 , the coecient on the interaction term v ct × i it .
The xed eects in this specication allow us to control for a variety of unobserved factors. The country-year xed eects control for countrylevel changes that aect exports across all sectors. The industry-year xed eects control for global shocks to the exports of each industry. Finally, the country-industry xed eects control for all time-invariant determinants of export composition. The regression estimates with this specication will be identied o of variation in the exports of particular industries in particular countries following VAT adoption.
As for measures of the VAT, v ct , I will make use of both a binary measure of VAT adoption and a more continuous measure that takes into account the VAT rate. While my empirical results will be consistent for the two types of measures, for interpretational reasons, my preferred specication makes use of the binary rather than the continuous measure. A diculty with using a measure such as the VAT rate is that countries with strong administrative capacities are likely to have high refund rates and are also more easily able to set a high VAT rate. This means that it can be misleading to treat a high VAT rate as an indicator of a more intense treatment for the purposes of this analysis.
As discussed in Section 3, in addition to the direct eect of higher input taxes, the VAT could also have general equilibrium eects that vary across industries. The regression specication (5) does not attempt to disentangle these general equilibrium eects from the direct eect of higher input taxes.
To take these general equilibrium eects into account, we can, again keeping equation (4) in mind, modify the regression specication to take the following form:
where w ct is a measure of income per person. The only dierence here relative to equation (5) is that we have a new term that captures the dierential general equilibrium eects.
Data

Data Sources
We can now turn to the data sources and variables that will be used to estimate the regression model. I obtain information on the VAT across the The literature commonly uses the VAT rate at introduction rather than the VAT rate in each year due to the diculty of obtaining a long time-series of VAT rates for such a large sample of countries. 7 While countries that never adopted the VAT could also be included in the sample, these countries with the notable exception of the U.S. tend to be either very small or are have exports that are extremely concentrated in natural resources, and so are not particularly well-suited to serve as a control group. Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics
Results
Baseline estimates
The baseline estimates for equation (5) To get a sense of the magnitude of this coecient, it is useful to consider some reasonable values for the relevant trade elasticity. From equation (5), we see that the elasticity that matters here is the Armington elasticity within an industry. Hummels (2001) and Hertel et al. (2007) estimate these elasticities at a level of aggregation that is comparable to the one used here, and nd that depending on the specication, the average of the estimated elasticities tends to range from 5 to 7. This would mean that a 12% decrease in exports would correspond to an approximately 1.5-2% increase in prices.
Columns 2-4 in Table 3 Table 2 ). Table 4 shows the results from empirical specications that are closer to equations (4) and (6), allowing us to make greater use of the theoretical framework in interpreting the estimates. Column 1 uses the standard VAT rate at introduction as a measure of the VAT rather than a binary indicator, and yields a point estimate of about -5. Assuming a trade elasticity of 7, into the model, the inferred refund rate would likely be higher.
Turning to the other columns in Table 4 , column 2 shows that when both the binary and the continuous measures are included, only the binary variable is statistically signicant. As discussed earlier, the continuous measure is unlikely to truly measure the intensity of the treatment across countries because countries with a high VAT rate are often those with strong tax administration and so are likely to have a relatively high refund rate. The true intensity of the treatment depends on both having a relatively low refund rate and a high tax rate something that would be quite dicult to measure.
Columns 3 and 4 bring us even closer to equation (4) 5.2 Heterogeneity across income levels Table 5 considers heterogeneity in these eects across countries of dierent income levels. Column 1 includes the interaction of the main treatment vari-able with a binary variable that records whether the country is a high income country or not.
8 The coecient on the new interaction term is statistically signicant and implies that the net eect on high income countries is close to zero, suggesting that the baseline results are driven primarily by low-and middle-income countries. Consistent with this, a test that the sum of the two coecients is equal to zero yields a t-statistic of about -0.51 (P-value ≈ 0.614), meaning that there is no statistically signicant eect for highincome countries.
Columns 2 and 3 explore further heterogeneity based on income level by including an interaction of the treatment with a low-income country indicator.
9 Column 2 suggests that the impact is indeed greater for low-income countries. Column 3 includes interactions of the main treatment with both high-and low-income indicators and nds that the eect on low income countries is greater than for middle-income countries the omitted group but that this dierence is not statistically signicant.
Taken together, these results imply that the VAT discourages intermediate input intensive exports specically in middle and low-income countries.
A natural interpretation for this nding is that the VAT refund system works in a more ideal manner in high-income countries, a point that would be consistent with anecdotal and survey evidence (e.g. Harrison and Krelove, 2005) .
Evidence on VAT refund administration
While these results are suggestive of the importance of the quality of VAT refund administration, it would useful to see whether we can link these results directly to information about VAT refunds across the world. We can obtain some relevant information from PwC and the World Bank (2017), which is a study that considers various aspects of the tax system faced by the same 8 The countries that are classied as high-income are those in Western Europe, as well as Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand. These are the countries that have been relatively high-income throughout the sample period.
9 Low-income status is based on the World Bank's classication system. hypothetical rm across the world and specically provides some data on VAT refunds. The main limitation of this study as applied to the current paper is that the hypothetical case study rm is one that does not export, and the study only provides information on VAT refunds when a refund is available to the case-study rm. Since, as documented in the study, VAT refunds are in practice restricted to exporters in many countries, we have relevant refund information on much fewer countries than those that are technically covered by the study.
Owing to these limitations, we can only consider a subsample of 56 countries for which we have the necessary information. Column 1 of Table 6 repeats the baseline regression on this subsample, and shows that the estimated coecient is comparable to the one obtained in the full sample. The three available indicators relating to VAT refunds are the likelihood of a VAT refund request triggering an audit, the number of weeks it generally takes for excess VAT credits to be refunded, and the number of compliance hours it takes to le a VAT refund. The remaining columns of Table 6 report the results of regressions that include an interaction of the main treatment variable with these characteristics of the refund system.
Column 2 uses an indicator variable that records whether an audit is either likely or very likely, as opposed to being unlikely or very unlikely. The coecient estimates show that the negative eect of the VAT on intermediate input intensive industries is driven by countries where audits are more likely.
The implied point estimate for countries where audits are unlikely is almost equal to zero. This is again consistent with VAT refund considerations being central to the results identied in this paper.
Columns 3 and 4 consider interactions of the main treatment with variables that record whether it takes more than 6 months for the rm to receive a refund and whether the refund request takes more than 24 hours of compliance time, respectively. There is some evidence that longer refund times are associated with a more negative eect on intermediate input intensive ex-ports, though there is no evidence of a signicant eect of compliance time.
When we include all three additional interaction terms in Column 5, we can see that only the interaction with audit likelihood is statistically signicant.
Taken together, these results are suggestive of an important role for the VAT refund audits. Frequency of audits presumably indicate a government that is reluctant to provide refunds and perhaps is weary of false claims.
These results imply that such a reluctance can have a serious distortionary eect on exports, and so there is potentially a substantial benet from improving this aspect of VAT administration.
Non-manufacturing industries
These baseline results look specically at the exports of manufacturing industries. It is natural to ask whether the results are substantially dierent for non-manufacturing industries such as agriculture, natural resources and services. The rst column of Table 7 includes agriculture and natural resource sectors. We see that the main coecient of interest is essentially the same with these inclusions. The second column includes the two services industries that we have data for. In this case, the coecient drops to a certain extent but is still of a similar general magnitude. When all industries are included, as in column 3, the main coecient of interest is about 0.80. This provides us with a somewhat more conservative magnitude than the baseline manufacturing results. This magnitude implies that an industry with a 10% point higher intermediate input share sees a decline in exports of about 8%
following VAT adoption. Based on the trade elasticities discussed earlier, this would correspond to an increase in prices of about 1-1.5%.
Replaced policies
The VAT was often introduced as a replacement for existing taxes. The most common taxes replaced by the VAT are dierent forms of turnover taxes, sales taxes, and taris (Ebril et al., 2001 ).
10 When the VAT replaces such existing policies, our estimates would capture the joint eect of removing these policies and adopting the VAT. Given that policies such as turnover taxes more obviously tax intermediate goods than the VAT does, it is perhaps surprising that we do nd a large negative eect of VAT adoption. This could reect in part the fact that countries in practice rely on the VAT to a much greater extent than they relied on the policies it replaced and so the VAT might simply matter more in an absolute sense. Table 8 draws on information about the policies that the VAT replaced from Ebril et al. (2001) to examine whether the impact of VAT adoption varies depending on which policies it replaced. Since this information is missing for many countries in our sample, the rst column repeats the baseline regression for the 77 countries for which we have information on replaced policies. We see that the estimated coecient for this sample of countries is comparable to the baseline. The second column of Table 7 introduces an interaction of the main treatment variable with a binary variable that records whether the policies replacing the VAT include trade taxes. The second and third columns repeat this exercise but with turnover and sales taxes, respectively, rather than trade taxes. The nal column includes all of the additional interaction terms.
Across these specications, we do not nd any signicant heterogeneity in the eect depending on the policies that were replaced by the VAT. This is perhaps especially surprising in the case of turnover taxes, which apply in principle to every stage of production without a crediting system as with the VAT. One explanation, as mentioned above, could be that countries rely more on the VAT than they did on the turnover taxes it replaced. Another relevant factor here is the fact that as noted in Ebril et al. such as imposing reduced rates on input goods. Particularly combined with the less signicant nature of these taxes in an absolute sense as compared to the VAT, this might help explain why we nd no evidence of heterogeneity in the eect based on dierences in replaced policies.
5.6
Trends and Placebo Tests
The empirical specication employed in this analysis looks at the dierential eect of VAT introduction across industries. By doing so, it helps reduce both simultaneous causality and policy endogeneity concerns relative to an analysis of country-level outcomes. For example, the country-year xed effects would help control for any tendency for countries to adopt the VAT in a period of greater growth of overall trade. The empirical strategy would be invalid if countries were more likely to introduce the VAT when industries that rely more on intermediate inputs were performing poorly. While there is to my knowledge no obvious reason to think that this might be the case, it is still worthwhile to consider some robustness tests that could help address such concerns. Table 9 shows two distinct ways of doing this. While we cannot include country-industry-year xed eects, we can include time trends at the countryindustry level. The rst two columns of Table 8 include 5-and 10-year linear growth trends of exports at the country-industry level. We can see that the main coecient of interest is largely unchanged with the inclusion of these trends.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 consider a type of placebo test. Specically, we pretend that the VAT was introduced either 10 or 20 years before the actual introduction date and see whether this placebo introduction has an eect by the year of true VAT introduction. This specically means that we are using a placebo treatment variable in place of the VAT variable and we drop the data for a country for all the years following VAT adoption. The results show that the placebo estimates are insignicant, suggesting that my main results are are in fact capturing the eect of VAT adoption rather than other coincidental trends.
Conclusion
This paper provides evidence of a substantial eect of the VAT on international trade. Specically, I nd that VAT adoption leads to a large negative eect on the exports of industries that tend to rely more heavily on intermediate goods. This eect is driven by low-and middle-income countries and is absent for high-income countries. These results are consistent with the VAT functioning as a tax on the input purchases of exporters in countries where, due to poor tax administration, governments fail to fully provide refunds to businesses with excess VAT credits. In evaluating the eect of the VAT historically, these results imply that the adoption of the VAT had negative eciency eects well beyond those generally expected of a consumption tax. Especially given the importance attached to export competitiveness in many developing countries, these ndings suggest that there could be a substantial benet from moving towards a more eective system of VAT refund administration. Country-year, sector-year and country-sector xed eects are included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
